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Theory of Mind in
Chimpanzees: A Rationalist
Approach
Benjamin Grant Purzycki
Abstract: The question of whether or not chimpanzees possess the
ability to mentally represent others' mental states has been a popular
question since Premack and Woodruff (1978) originally asked the
question. It is well established that humans have a theory of mind
(ToM), but extending this psychological faculty to our evolutionary
cousins has created a massive amount of literature and research
attempting to resolve this issue. Such a resolution is arguably not
possible given the nature of the debate. An Either/Or approach to
chimpanzee theory of mind both ignores the essential components of
ToM as well as foreclosing on the possibility that there is variability of
the iriformational encapsulation at the modular level between closely
related species.

The Modular Mind and Naturalism
In order to discuss ToM, it is imperative to summarize the
body of scientific advancements, particularly in the realm of cognitive
science, to understand the theoretical backdrop behind the current
debate. The most influential production concerning the Modular or
Computational Theory of Mind comes from Jerry Fodor's classic The
Modular Mind (Fodor 1983).1 Firstly, the distinction between mind
and brain is important to make. While the brain, a biological structure,
is responsible for the bulk of what constitutes an organism's behavior,
the mind can be divided conceptually into various functions or
faculties. Fodor thus defines "facuIty psychology" as the "view that
many fundamentally different kinds of psychological mechanisms must
be postulated in order to explain the facts of mental life" (Fodor 1983:
1). In other words, there are a number of innate, cognitive mental
mechanisms that are responsible for particular functions, or "domainspecific".
Domain-specificity is defined by Hirschfeld and Gelman as
"the idea that all concepts are not equal, and that the structure of
knowledge is different in important ways across distinct content
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areas ... [i.e.] cognitive abilities [that] are specialized to handle specific
types of information" (Hirschfeld & Gelman 1994: 3). Put differently,
there are a number of different ways of organizing what is perceived,
and various mental structures are responsible for organizing different
bodies of information; e.g. language, a template-system of intuitive
ontology, naive physics, etc. (Boyer 2001; Boyer & Barrett
Forthcoming; Chomsky 2000; Vosniadou 1994 respectively). This
essay focuses specifically on mental functions; not the brain as a
biological structure.
As for the study of mind, whether human or chimpanzee,
Chomsky notes that "a 'naturalistic approach' to the mind investigates
mental aspects of the world as we do any others, seeking to construct
intelligible explanatory theories, with the hope of eventual integration
with the 'core' natural sciences" (Chomsky 2000). What Chomsky and
others hope for is an understanding of the domain-specific mechanisms
of the mind, how they operate, and what they do with specific
representational information. Summing up the naturalistic program,
Sperber notes that "Representations, whether mental or public, are
themselves objects in the world" (2000: 3). Such an approach is
attempted here, though the difficulties in such an investigation
concerning chimpanzee cognition should be abundantly clear and
equally problematic.
The most conservative of definitions, according to Jerry
Fodor, claims that there are four distinct characteristics of modularity:
encapsulation, inaccessibility, domain specificity, and innateness
(Fodor
1998:
127-128).
Encapsulation,
or "informational
encapsulation" is the idea that modules have hardwired information
within them, which informs perception and that "Information flow
between modules-and between modules and whatever unmodularized
systems the mind may contain-is constrained by mental architecture"
(127). Optical illusions (Fig. 1) provide such an example: regardless
of what we actually know about the illusion-it remains illusory.
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The above illustration is deceptive: the center circles are the
same size, yet the center circle on the left looks considerably larger than
the center circle on the right. Even though we know they are the same
size, the illusion is maintained because our cognitive architecture
demands it. "Inaccessibility" refers to the idea that while incoming
information cannot alter the state of or the information contained within
the target module (encapsulation) itself, the target module cannot
inform outside information-in other words, "it is supposed not to be
available for the subject's voluntary report" (Ibid). This, however, does
not exclude the researcher from identifying a modular faculty.
The question, then, becomes what precisely should be
considered modular, based on the above-listed qualifications. Many
have argued that the ToM is a modular characteristic of both our own
species and chimpanzees. Before returning to this debate, it is
necessary to examine whether chimpanzees employ a general learning
mechanism or indeed have "domain-specific" mental organs that
organize perception and thought. If we can safely assume our own
minds are organized in such a specific way-are researchers
susceptible to applying an invalid degree of anthropomorphism to
chimpanzees when considering their minds?
Tooby and Cosmides (1992) aptly articulate the main
theoretical difference between behaviorist and nativist approaches to
the mind. They distinguish between what they call the Standard Social
Science Model (SSSM) and the Integrated Causal Model (lCM). The
SSSM is "The consensus view of the nature of social and cultural
phenomena that has served for a century as the intellectual framework
for the organization of psychology and the social sciences and the
intellectual justification for their claims of autonomy from the rest of
science" (Cosmides & Tooby 1992: 23). Because of this century-long
stagnation of development, "the central concept in psychology [has
been] learning", rather than innateness (29). In other words, most
behavior is learned, rather than an expression of genetically endowed
faculties. And such learning, according to the SSSM, must be
"equipotential, content-free, content-independent, general-purpose,
domain-general... these mechanisms [of learning] must be constructed
in such a way that they can absorb any kind of cultural message or
environmental input equally well" (29). The ICM, on the other hand,
attempts to locate specific qualities of the mind, their function(s), and
under what conditions are they optimal. While Cosmides and Tooby
argue that such domain-specific mechanisms have been specifically
selected for evolutionarily, this debate lies outside the scope of this
paper (for further information on Evolutionary Psychology, see Buss
2004; Barrett et al. 2002).
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Theory of Mind: Development in Humans
Concerning the growth of innate faculties, our own species
illustrates an interesting trend during development. Gopnik and
Wellman note that there are three main stages of a child's cognitive
development with regards to the ToM. At 2 years, a child is equipped
with "psychological knowledge [that] seems to be structured largely in
terms of two types of internal states, desires, on the one hand, and
perceptions, on the other" (Gopnik & Wellman 1994: 265). In other
words, a landmark achievement in childhood development in an
understanding of others' mental states such as needs-the
understanding that "what is in the mind can change what is in the
world"-and the understanding that "what is in the mind depends on
what is in the world" (265).
By 3 years of age, an elaboration of mental activities and
states occurs. Such concepts of "think, know, remember, makebelieve, dream" are understood as mental activities, while a 5-year-old
has a fully "representational model of mind". By this time, mental
states including "beliefs [and false-beliefs], pretences, and images" are
but a few of the psychological understandings of normally developed
children. Baron-Cohen' s (1997) groundbreaking essay on "mindblindness" of autistic children who have an impaired or lack a ToM
illustrates that understanding mental states is quite a task for
individuals afflicted with such disorders. It should be kept in mind,
then, that if chimpanzees lack a ToM, they would behave in a similar
manner to autistic individuals, which, as discussed below, is clearly not
the case.
Premack and Woodruff (1978) were the fIrst to ask whether
chimpanzees have a ToM. Premack and Woodruff understand the ToM
as an "individual [that] imputes mental states to himself and to others"
(515). They argue that "assigning mental states to another individual is
not a sophisticated or advanced act, but a primitive one" (525). The
question of whether or not the chimpanzee (or human, for that matter)
is correct in hislher inference of attributing a mental state to another is
irrelevant (but interesting)-the question is whether such inferences
occur. Premack and Woodruff note that
Only on two occasions are the inferences [of mental states] not found:
when there is not enough understanding of the scene to permit the
inference, as in the young, confused child, or when the inference indeed
occurs, but is quite deliberately suppressed, as by a sophisticated adult
who, having been taught the differences between data and inference,
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elects on this occasion to give what he calls an objective 'description'
(525).
Byrne and Whiten elaborate: "If an individual is able to respond
differentially, according to the beliefs and desires of another individual
(rather than according to the other's overt behaviour), then it possesses
a theory of mind" (Byrne & Whiten 1997: 8). In sum, then, a behavior
exhibiting a reaction based on an understanding of another's beliefs and
desires would be the shadow cast from the substance of a theory of
mind module or mechanism (ToMM).
On the other hand, one must be wary when regarding certain
behaviors as indicators of a ToM. Take, for example, a squirrel that
takes flight each time a human approaches. While it may be argued
that the squirrel has a ToM because it has an understanding of the
human's mental state (e.g. "wanting to eat it"), such a conclusion
ignores the possibility that the squirrel is reacting to the human and not
its mental states. Comparing the cognitive capacity of a squirrel with
that of a chimpanzee is inherently absurd-primarily because of the
fact that chimpanzees' do indeed display a certain degree of protean
behavior. Geoffrey Miller argues that this proteanism-the capacity
for unpredictable behavior-is an evolutionarily sound feature of the
animal kingdom (Miller 1997).
More specifically, individual
chimpanzees require a degree of unpredictability in order to fool others,
ergo maximizing fitness.
While some have argued that "reading minds" is an innate
faculty of our species and-by extension-chimpanzees, others argue
that such a trait is wholly learned. For instance, Perner, Ruffinan, and
Leekam (Perner et al. 1994) argue that "sibling interaction provides a
rich 'data base' for building a theory of mind" because "children from
larger families [are] better able than children from smaller families to
predict" a false-belief in a character of a story narrated to them. The
main problem with Perner et al. 's thesis is the fact that they confuse
mast~ry of mind reading with the ability to read minds. In other words,
if a child is not employing or "exercising" this faculty, they will not be
as adept at identifying false-beliefs, intentions, etc. to a given agent. It
should be argued, however, that having more siblings better prepares
the ToM faculty, rather than actually "bestowing" it upon an individual.
While Perner et al. contend that their findings create a "serious problem
for nativist proposals and various developmental explanations relying
on internal maturation", they deem Fodor's "earlier, less radical
claims" compatible with their own data (1994). Unfortunately, Perner
et al. remain unclear regarding the distinction between learned vs.
developed (what is already there) when they claim that ''the finding that
74

siblings help develop a theory of mind is compatible with the
sociocognitive tradition [which emphasizes] intellectual progress as a
function of social interaction among peers and view intellectual growth
as a process of internalizing the knowledge already incorporated in the
social interaction" (1994).
In sum, Perner et al. 's data do not create problems for "nativist
proposals," if anything they support them, as "poverty of the stimulus"
arguments contend. Scholl and Leslie (1999) note that "whenever
modularity exists, it is always a matter of degree."2 Put differently,
Chomsky argues that "a central part of what we call 'learning' is
actually better understood as the growth of cognitive structures [which
are innately endowed] along an internally directed course under the
triggering and partially shaping effect of the environment" (Chomsky,
1980: 33. Emphasis added.). If this truly is the case, one may feasibly
pose the question to Perner et al.: where did only-children "learn" a
theory of mind? If the answer is from the parents, that would certainly
not disqualify a single child from "learning" a theory of mind, but
rather reducing the amount of stimulation. But "poverty of the
stimulus" arguments contend that the stimulus itself is impoverished (in
this case, behavior}-a great deal of our thinking is the result of
inference-making rather than a recording of all behaviors and
outcomes. What we see is extremely limited-what we intuit is just as,
if not more, important than the behaviors that stimulate mental activity
(Fodor 1985).
Primate/Machiavellian Intelligence

One scheme of what constitutes a ToM comes from Simon
Baron-Cohen, who notes that while it "is clear that many monkey
species and the apes show social intelligence in that they form
alliances, keep track of social status, and behave tactically in grooming
those allies they depend on .. .it is not necessarily evidence of the
possession of a theory of mind" (1999: 14). Baron-Cohen argues that
there are eight requirements that must be met in order to grant one a
ToM, namely: a) intentionally communicating with others; b) repairing
failed communication with others; c) teaching others; d) intentionally
persuading others; e) intentionally deceiving others,; t) building shared
plans and goals; g) intentionally sharing a focus or topic of intention;
and h) pretending (Baron-Cohen 1999). Baron-Cohen unnecessarily
separates "persuasion" and "deception"; deception is simply a specific
form of persuasion. In other words, if an individual deceives, he or she
persuades-deception is successful persuasion of something false.
Such qualifications are discussed below, resulting in the identification
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of what may be the only lacking qualification-building shared plans
and goals. However, all of the above requirements spring from the core
qualities of a ToM: understanding beliefs, desires, and intentions in
others.
At this point, it should be clear that the notion of "general
intelligence" is not applicable to our own species, as domain-specificity
proves. However, the question arises as to whether our evolutionary
cousins Pan troglodytes operate under such modes of "general
intelligence" or not. If "general intelligence" were applicable, we
would fmd individual chimpanzees in a single social group behaving in
the same manner, as they would be exposed to the same stimuli. Put
differently, general intelligence in this case forecloses on the possibility
of within-group variability. This, however, turns out not to be the case
(see Goodall 1990). In addition, Tomasello and Boesch (1998) argue
that, indeed, chimpanzees are "cultural" beings. If "culture" is "a set of
processes" rather than "monolithic", chimpanzees exhibit a number of
varying behaviors that qualify as cultural insofar that they are both
specific to a certain group and learned behaviors (591). In addition,
relationships between individual chimpanzees based on rank are clearly
different across individuals.
Tomasello arid Boesch note that we can "posit that the
naturally occurring behaviors of a primate group may be assumed to be
cultural.. . when (1 ) two groups of the same species differ in a
behavior ... (2) there are no obvious differences in the environments of
the two groups ... and (3) there are no genetic differences between
individuals that acquire the behavior and those that do not" (1998: 592593). Such qualifying factors imply that learning is taking place on an
individual level, rather than a predisposition for certain behaviors
among all individuals. Tomasello and Boesch note that "ecological
differences in the environment inhabited by different chimpanzee
populations may in some cases be a direct explanation for the variations
we observe between them" (593). While chimpanzees of Mount Nimba
in West Africa, Gombe, and Tar crack nuts against tree trunks, the
chimpanzees of Bossou do not because the fruit Strychnos that contains
the nuts do not grow in the area that the Bossou inhabit (594). On the
other hand, using a stick for extracting bone marrow from red colobus
monkeys has only been observed among the Tar, even though all
species hunt the red colobus (594).
In sum, it is doubtful that while chimpanzees are endowed
with an obviously less specialized mind as humans have, their minds
are not organized in a different manner in terms of domain-specificity.
While different groups of chimpanzees exhibit different behaviors, this
does not foreclose on the possibility that chimpanzees are born with
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minds as a tabula rasa. Further proof of this lies in chimpanzees'
application of their ability to deceive others in a number of ways.
Machiavellianism has been defined as "a strategy of social
conduct that involves manipulating others for personal gain, often
against the other's self-interest" (Wilson et al. 1996, quoted in Byrne &
Whiten 1998: 12). If a chimpanzee fools another in order to, for
example, acquire resources (sexual or nutritional), the "fooling" alone
does not necessarily suggest a ToM immediately. On the other hand,
such acts of deception which rely on "whether an individual can
discriminate another'sfalse beliefwould be the most convincing way to
demonstrate a true reading of 'mind'" (Whiten 1998: 144). Has this
been demonstrated?
Franz de Waal recounts how a chimpanzee Yeroen mildly hurt
his hand in a fight with another chimp named Nikkie. One observer
noticed that Yeroen only limped when Nikkie was around. De Waal
confirmed this when he noticed that once Yeroen was out ofNikkie's
field of vision, he would walk normally (de Waal 2000: 35). Not only
does this imply that chimpanzees are aware that "seeing is knowing"
(see below), but also that an individual chimp wanted another to
believe he was hurt. This behavior lasted a week, during which
"Yeroen kept an eye on Nikkie to see whether he was being watched"
(Ibid). This example fulfills not only the "pretending" qualification of
possessing a ToM, but the "persuasion" and "deception" components as
well. The next grouping of criterion falls under the general heading of
"social" or "shared intentions."
At this point, Tomasello et al. (2004) argue that ''the crucial
difference between human cognition and that of other species", namely,
"the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with
shared goals and intentions:
shared intentionality" (1).
What
immediately comes to mind is the question of chimpanzee collaborative
hunting, which Tomasello et al. consider: "The most complex
cooperative activity of chimpanzees is group hunting, in which two or
more males seem to play different roles in corralling a monkey" (18).
Tomasello et al. render such cooperation as having no difference from
hunting carried out by other social mammals (e.g. lions and wolves),
which operates on impulse and opportunistic frenzies. In addition,
Tomasello et al. find it "almost unimaginable that two chimpanzees
might spontaneously do something as simple as carry something
together or help one another make a tool" (19). In the case discussed
below, it is clear that chimpanzees-if given the chance-will behave
in a manner that benefits the agent solely, rather than any cooperative
behavior that would indicate a shared intention (see Kennedy, this
volume).
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However, Tomasello et al. overlook the fact that chimpanzees
will act cooperatively by forging coalitions to overthrow an alpha male,
let alone work together to maintain the power of an alpha (see de Waal
2000: 139-149; Goodall 1990: 98-111). It should be noted that
coalitions are created at fantastically frequent rates, (ca. 1,000-1,500
per year in captivity), but the overthrowing of an alpha does not (de
Waal 2000: 31). If this irrefutable fact of coalition building to
overthrow an alpha were a result from "observation" (that is, assuming
chimpanzees are true behaviorists), it would be quite a feat to explain
coalition forging and alpha-overthrowing in such terms. Individuals
participating would collectively have to understand that their goal is,
indeed, to get rid of an existing alpha. If chimpanzees were incapable
of doing so, all those involved in the overthrow of an alpha would have
to have already observed not only the removal of an alpha, but also a
collaborative effort to do so. Moreover, they would have to be able to
understand the outcome as a result from the collaborative effort if they
are to repeat the process. Individuals who build coalitions are
obviously goal-oriented and require assistance from others to achieve
this goal. This suggests, indeed, that chimpanzees have a ToM.
However, mundane, everyday behaviors are far better
indicators for shared intentionality. De Waal, for instance, observes
that individual chimpanzees will hold branches for others to climb into
trees guarded by electrical fence. The branches are placed in a manner
that requires one individual to reinforce the instability of the formation
while another climbs the branches in order to gather otherwise
unobtainable leaves (2000: 198-199). Even an adult helping an infant
out of a tree indicates that there is some degree of sharing by way of
understanding another's predicament (30). Moreover, the fact that after
engaging in conflict, chimpanzees will avoid each other until one of the
combatants expresses a behavior indicative of a truce (e.g. extending a
hand). Such a "collaborative" avoidance not only indicates mutual
animosity, but also suggests that each individual involved in a conflict
"keep in mind" that alleviating the tension has yet to occur.
Turning to a related question: is seeing believing or indicative
of understanding another's mental states? More specifically, does joint
attention imply shared intention? Flombaum and Santos (2005)
recently published findings that suggest rhesus monkeys are equipped
with the understanding that a researcher's inability to see a hidden
grape provides an opportunity to steal it. Povinelli and Eddy (1996a)
conducted a study to determine whether chimpanzees followed a
human's gaze. In one case, the human looked at a specific location
with only his eyes, while in another case the human looked with both
eyes and head. They found that "subjects looked where the human was
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looking equally often whether or not the head was moved,
demonstrating the efficacy of eye direction alone" (Tomasello & Call
1997: 317). In another experiment (Povinelli & Eddy 1996b),
researchers stared directly at a Plexiglas wall. The assumption was that
the chimps would bypass the wall, rather than inspect it, if the line of
gaze were of particular significance in the chimps' minds. However,
chimps consistently looked at both sides of the partition-with
particular emphasis on the side available to the researcher's viewrather than exhibiting a primary concern with the wall at the end of the
room. In sum, chimpanzees determined that the Plexiglas wall was of
the researcher's interest, rather than blindly following his line of
vision.
De Waal also reports an occasion when researchers hid a
number of fruits in an enclosed area. Chimpanzees in an area close saw
the researchers enter the area-with a box full of fruit-then leave the
area with an empty box. When the chimps were allowed into the area,
they searched "madly" without finding any of the fruit:
A number of apes passed the place where the grapefruits were hidden
without noticing anything-at least that is what we thought. Dandy
[the name of one chimp] too had passed over the hiding place where the
grapefruits were hidden without stopping or slowing down at all and
without showing any undue interest. That afternoon, however, when all
the apes were lying dozing in the sun, Dandy stood up and made a beeline for the spot. Without hesitation he dug up the grapefruits and
devoured them at his leisure. If Dandy had not kept the location of the
place a secret, he would probably have lost the grapefruits to the others
(1990: 62).
Even if this were not the first time Dandy behaved with such cunning,
he still would require an understanding that if he suppressed
acknowledgement of the fruit, others would not enjoy the bounty. Not
only was Dandy planning, but also intentionally, and probably
consciously, deceiving others in order to better himself.
Elsewhere, Byrne and Whiten (Byrne & Whiten, 1992) review
the complexity of tactical deception, which they define ''functionally, as
'acts from the normal repertoire of the agent, deployed such that
another individual is likely to misinterpret what the acts signify, to the
advantage of the agent"'. Obviously, "Acts of deception involve other
primates: as objects to be manipulated, as social tools to manipulate
others, or even sometimes as the resource to be gained". On the other
hand, it also implies that the deceivers/deceived must be able to both
retaliate and remember (1992).
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According to Byrne and Whiten, "the two Pan species and the
Papio baboons are significantly over-represented in records of
deception. By contrast, no clear case of deception has yet been
reported for strepsirhine primates or tarsiers" (1992). The data
collected by Byrne and Whiten were exclusively anecdotal, which
opens the procedural doors to many problems. Povinelli and Vonk
argue that the
real problem with the anecdotes is not that it is unparsimonious to
account for chimpanzee deception by appealing to associative learning
models ... [but] that each anecdote presupposes a behavioral abstraction
on the basis of which a mental state is inferred, without specifying what
unique causal work the second-order mental state performs (2003:
159).
In other words, anecdotal "evidence" for chimpanzees' mental
representations inherently relies on the assumption that representations
of behaviors already occur-something which has yet to be proven,
according to Povinelli and Vonk. So, for instance, if one were to
observe a chimpanzee deceiving another into thinking he does not have
food, the observer is already attributing an understanding of mental
states to the chimpanzee without testing.
The problems with
experimental procedures that attempt to definitively reveal that chimps
have an understanding of others' mental states are equally problematic.
By now, it should be clear that there is no question that
chimpanzees' have representational or intentional minds. For instance,
Goodall notes that in the wild, "often an individual prepares a tool for
use on a termite mound that is several hundred yards away and
absolutely out of sight", implying that not only do chimpanzees' have
the capacity to retain a complex amalgam of representations (termite
hill; need to use tool to collect termites; how to construct tool; how to
use tool; location of termite hill; "my" location in response to termite
hill), but also the ability to plan based on said representations (1990:
22). If chimpanzees were observed to construct such a toolfor another
chimpanzee, this would add more evidence of a ToM, but would still
fall under scrutiny that such a behavior was learned. Either way, it
would suggest that "shared intentions" were evident.

Discussion
The arguments made by a number of skeptics regarding the
chimpanzee's ability to mentally represent others' mental states boil
down to a few fundamental, yet ultimately unanswerable (arguably)
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questions. Firstly, until chimpanzees can fully articulate what they
understand in a comprehensively intelligible way, humans may never
have defmitive proof that chimps have a ToM. Taken to the extreme,
Robert M. Gordon argues that "one familiar with the recent literature
ought to conclude that there is still no convincing evidence of theory of
mind in human primates" (Gordon 1998: 120). If the ToM is defined
as "the anticipation, explanation, and social coordination of behavior",
Gordon reasons, we certainly cannot attribute a ToM to our own
species because "a very important part of our social behavior-our
emotional responses to ephemeral shifts in another's vocal and facial
expression-seems chiefly to rely on fast processing that does not
await causal analysis" (121).
Put differently, individuals react to such subtle behaviors
(which they may not even be conscious of) that an understanding of
another'S mental states is not necessary. Gordon fails to understand
precisely what he is doing: namely, by assuming that supporters of
ToM do not understand or have not read (a mental activity) the "recent
literature," he is surely granting them a mental state, however
impoverished Gordon thinks they may be. In sum, attributing mental
states to an individual that is not present may very well be the best
proof of a ToM in our species. Such philosophical hair-splitting
revolves around-yet argues against Cartesian understandings of the
mind and its operations (Descartes 1998: 35-39). Mental activities such
as thought prove existence-yet thinking about external stimulation is
actually meditating on the representation of the said stimulation (127).
Descartes notes that making "the inference 'I am walking, therefore I
exist'" is not a plausible conclusion "except in so far as the awareness
of walking is a thought" (Ibid). The question of modularity in this case,
however, is less clear.
Descartes interestingly observed that
if I look out of the window and see men crossing the square, as I just
happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men
themselves ... Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which could
conceal automatons? I judge that they are men. And so something
which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by
the faculty of judgment which is in my mind (Descartes 1998: 85).
In sum, we do not look at others without granting them
agency. In terms of modularity, this ability fits under Fodor's original
qualifications. While Descartes was incorrect insofar as he understood
an agent as an intellectual exercise, rather than an innate faculty, he
certainly described ToM aptly. Gopnik creates a first-person narrative
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describing the world according to an autist. People sitting around the
individual are described as "bags of skin [that] are draped over chairs,
and stuffed into pieces of cloth, they shift and protrude in unexpected
ways" (1993; quoted in Baron-Cohen 1997: 4-5). Are we to believe,
then, that chimpanzees truly look at the world-especially their fellow
chimps-in this manner?
We grant agency without necessarily being aware of it. In
other words, we do not look at others and acknowledge the fact that we
are seeing more than "hats and coats which could conceal automatons".
The information that is encapsulated is the attribution of agency, and
arguably with experience, this attribution is elaborated and specified:
in the case of our own species, attributing mental states as "dreaming"
and "making-believe" are not innate, but elaborations or outgrowths of
attributing agency. In the case of chimpanzees, ToM is less specific or
sophisticated-rather than completely absent. The question, then, turns
itself inward: are we simply anthropomorphizing chimpanzees because
of our own innate faculties?
Anthropomorphizing has been included in Brown's human
universals,. a characteristic that is demonstrated around the world by all
peoples (Brown 1991: 139). While Brown notes that this trait is
generally found in religious contexts, anthropomorphizing occurs in
other contexts as well. One common view of anthropomorphism is the
notion that our species animates certain entities (e.g. God, ghosts,
chimpanzees, etc.) in order to understand them better and to mitigate
fears surrounding them. Pascal Boyer argues that firstly, "gods and
spirits are not represented as having human features in general but as
having minds, which is much more specific" and secondly, ''the
concept of a mind is not exclusively human," meaning we attribute
agency to all entities rendered intentional (Boyer 2001: 144). In other
words, we intuitively (i.e. naturally) attribute a will and desires to
animate entities-this is the crux of anthropomorphism (Ibid). Are
primate psychologists guilty of inappropriately attributing "a mind" to
chimpanzees in this case?
Povinelli and Vonk (2003) tend to think so by suggesting that
the chimpanzee mind seems so much like our own because "the human
mind may have evolved a unique mental system that cannot help
distorting the chimpanzee's mind, obligatorily recreating it in its own
image" (2003: 157). Like religious ideas, we may be projecting our
own qualities on chimpanzees by granting them a ToM by our intuitive
inference making. But if in fact chimpanzees do have such an
understanding of others' mental states, and we agree that they do, we
would still be anthropomorphizing-we would simply be accurate in
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our inference-making. This attribution of other minds, on the other
hand, creates a problem for such hair-splitters such as Gordon.
Gordon's question also relates to what Chomsky and others
call "Descartes' problem", namely ''the emphasis on the creative aspect
of language use and on the fundamental distinction between human
language and the purely functional and stimulus-bound animal
communication systems, rather than the Cartesian attempts to account
for human abilities" (Chomsky 2002: 55). While Chomsky is
specifically discussing the "creative aspect of human language", the
same argument may be applied, as Gordon has, with respect to
chimpanzee ToM. Firstly, if all of these "subtleties" that Gordon refers
to are actually the sum-total of the stimuli, and behaviors that are a
response to the processing of that sum-total, this still does not deny the
possibility of a ToMM because such a module requires stimulation for
engagement Gust like the optical illusion example provided above).
Secondly, such arguments foreclose on the possibility of a "creative
aspect" of chimpanzee behavior. The point is, Gordon is taking a
purely behaviorist approach to the ToM-mostly a mental activity.
In addition, what Gordon does not acknowledge, but alludes to
(perhaps not consciously) is what Chomsky calls "Plato's problem":
"How is it possible that we have the knowledge that we do have? What
is the knowledge that we do have and on what basis could we possibly
have acquired it?" (Chomsky 2004: 207; 1980: 180). A behaviorist
such as Gordon assumes such knowledge is learned and behaviors are
reacted to based on either previous experience or processing a number
of subtle gestures that "do not await causal analysis". If such a suite of
subtleties do not "await causal analysis", then such subtleties are
arguably purely instinctual, rather than a choice on the part of an agent.
This fits nicely with Fodor's definition of modularity, but denies the
ability of researchers to explain such behaviors. In sum, then, ToM
cannot be ultimately "proven" behaviorally or "behavioralistically".
For instance, Povinelli and Vonk (2003) note that "those who
believe that deceptive chimpanzees possess a theory of mind must
postulate two things: first, that they possess behavioral abstractions,
and second, that they possess representations of mental states" (158).
They argue that for the entire body of data produced by chimpanzee
observation to be of any explanatory value, only "behavioral
abstractions will suffice". (2003: 159) Similar observations made by
Scott (2001) divide the approaches into those who attribute ToM to
chimpanzees and those who simply learn "from past experiences", in
other words a representational memory of behavior, rather than a
representational understanding of others' representations.
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Many have called such representations "metarepresentations"
(see Sperber 2000). Andrew Whiten (2000) discerns between two
types of metarepresentations. Sense (1) is "A mental representation of
a mental representation." An example ofthis is (in the mind of you, the
reader) "John believes in ghosts". You understand that John's belief in
ghosts is a mental activity-so John's representation is now yours, so
to speak. Sense (2) is "A mental representation of a mental
representation as a representation (2000: 140). So, your understanding
that John's belief in ghosts is a representation is a representation.
Does this occur in chimpanzees?
The Premacks (1983: 57-67; 2003: 145-157) conducted a
study in which the chimpanzees were shown videotaped images of
actors attempting to solve a number of problems. In the fIrst test, an
actor attempted to reach inaccessible bananas (hanging overhead, lay
outside a cage, blocked by a large box). In another number of tests,
a
actors were confronted with "malfunctioning equipment:
disconnected hose, a phonograph whose cord was unplugged, a gas
heater that was unlit", etc (2003: 146). After viewing the videos, Sarah
(the Premacks' test subject) was given an envelope with photos of the
solution and solutions to other problems. Initially, Sarah chose the
correct solution to 18 out of20 problems. The Premack's note that her
mistakes were likely due to "her ignorance of the difference between
chimpanzee and human strength" (she "assumed" that a human could
push a brick-fIlled box aside, rather than empty it) and "an unclear
photo" (146). Children, on the other hand, who were presented with
this task failed 50 percent of the time. Even after altering the study to
accommodate children's' "suburban lifestyles" (e.g. cookies out of
reach on top of a refrigerator), they continued to fail at the same rate.
The Premacks argue that the difference lies between the ability
of chimps to identify, i.e. mentally represent, a "problem" rather than a
simple sequence of events on a video. The chimps had to attribute a
goal on the part of the actors presented in the fIlm, whereas three-anda-half year old children failed at a larger rate due to their failure to
attribute a goal to the actors. It would be highly informative to give the
same tests to older children, as their ToM is mostly fully functional (see
above). Can one still maintain the stance that Sarah may have
"learned" this ability---especially after being confronted with a novel
test? Sarah represented not only the problem identifIed by the actors
and the problem itself (Sense 1), but recognized it as a problem (Sense
2).
The following provides the logic employed by Either/Or
approaches to understanding ToM in a behavioral context. Considering
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much of the debates revolve around "learned" behaviors versus "innate
ideas", the equations are divided as such:
Behaviorist
a)

Initial behavior + Representation of behavior & outcome
(successful)7 Repeated behavior

b) Initial behavior + Representation of situation7 Repeated behavior
Nativist (Either/Or)
c)

ToMM7 Representation engaging module7 Initial Behavior7 a)
and/or b)

d) ToMM7 Representation engaging module7 Behavior X7 New
(similar) situation7 ToM module7 Representation engaging
module7 Behavior Y
e)

ToMM7 Representation engaging module7 Behavior X7 New
(different) situation7 ToMM7 Representation engaging
module7 Behavior Y

t)

ToMM7 Representation engaging module7 Behavior X7 New
(similar) situation7 ToMM7 Representation engaging module7
Behavior X

g)

ToMM7 Representation engaging module7 Behavior X7 New
(different) situation7 ToMM7 Representation engaging
module7 Behavior X

All "learned theories" of mind assume that the behavior, rather than the
intentions or mental states of another individual are represented in the
mind. While a) grants the subject agency, or a choice, b) would rely on
the notion that the repeated behavior is more instinctual or automatic,
rather than premeditated.
However, the logic of "innateness"
arguments do not necessarily foreclose on the possibility of
premeditation although most who argue for modularity of the ToM
support the notion of premeditated deceptive behaviors.
Both d) and e) rely on the assumption that "Descartes'
problem" (in the Chomskyan sense) is answered-new behaviors will
apply to either new situations that are similar enough to previous
experience (thus maintaining one step ahead of the deceived, for
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example) (d) or a completely novel experience (e). The logic employed
in f) and g) do not demand that a subject displays a new behavior each
time a novel situation occurs, but f) relies on either the new situation
involving a different individual and the same interpretation of the
situation. If, however, the individual who is deceived, for example, is
the same individual in the previous experience-the deceived is either
not equipped with the ability to "figure things out" (Le. too dumb to
learn) or simply that the deceiver's behavior is relatively new.
Looking at a) and b), the question begs: when did behavior
originate? At some point, the behavior must have been an act of
creativity (overcoming an obstacle) and either must be learned and
remembered continuously throughout generations (thus lowering the
amount of creativity in chimpanzees) or spontaneously occurs
throughout chimpanzee populations more often, rather than a behavior
lineage of some sort (thus heightening the creative abilities in chimps).
The former relies on the assumption that chimpanzees have less of a
capacity for creative tactical deception or protean behavior. What must
be understood, however, is the fact that if this were the case, a
chimpanzee would require the ability to understand the difference
between a deceptive tactic and a behavior that accidentally may have
been deceptive. 3
If Chimp X learned a deceptive tactic from Chimp Y, not only
the behavior and the outcome have been committed to memory
(representations), but the motive or appropriateness of behavior must
be understood as well. This indicates that chimpanzees do indeed
possess an understanding of others' mental states based on the
requirement of understanding the concomitant basic point of a
deceptive behavior. In sum, chimpanzees would have to be able to
understand the rationale of a deceptive tactic as well as the ability not
to be fooled in order to learn from another chimpanzee.
In a naturalistic setting, there is no a priori reason to foreclose
on the possibility that even scientists cannot be fooled by such a
potentially subtle behavior. The fact that such surprising finds have
been so recent in the realm of primatology only reinforces this. If we
are susceptible to projecting our own anthropomorphizing minds onto
others, we certainly may not account for certain subtleties. Some data
collection methods simply are not capable of keeping such a close
watch on a number of individuals (Altmann 1970). Problematically,
however, experimental settings are susceptible-and frequently under
scrutiny from-to the skeptical argument that the chimpanzees were
taught a focal behavior.
However, should we think of the ToM in an Either/Or
manner? If we discount the prescribed "collaborative intentionality",
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chimpanzees, it would seem, have the capacity to read other's mindsbut with a limited number of abstraction-level mental state categories.
The category which they fail to fulfill is likely concomitant to more
If ToM is modular,
complexly social animals-i.e. humans.
"collaborative intentionality" should not necessarily be a conditionsuch an extra or more complex system of social cognition is likely
equipped with another cognitive mechanism at work-rather than more
encapsulated information. In other words, chimp ToM is likely only
equipped with the mental abstractions of "seeing" and "desiring", with
an emphasis on how to properly exploit others in order to benefit one's
self (egocentric) whereas human ToM can be employed to
accommodate collaborative intentionality-arguably made possible
only by another psychological mechanism.
Returning to Baron-Cohen's explication of "mind-blindness",
we find what he calls the "Autism Spectrum" (2003). At the extreme
end of this spectrum, we find low-functioning autists who are unable to
perform false-belief ToM related tasks that individuals with Down's
syndrome can perform (1997: 71). Baron-Cohen briefly discusses the
difference between high-functioning autists and those who have
Asperger's syndrome (AS) who have difficulty in picking up on social
cues: "Compared with someone of the same age and IQ level without
autism, all people with autism or AS are seen as socially odd, odd in
their communication, and unusually obsessional, to varying degrees"
(2003: 136). If there is, then, an Autism Spectrum, is there not
conversely and ToM spectrum?
What a "degree" model would throw into question is how
developed our own ToM truly is in terms of informational
encapsulation. Intuitively, it is probably not so much the case that
"dreaming" is an innate concept, but such innate mental abstractions
such as "knowing" or "believing" are likely evolutionarily sound
It is also more likely that such initial
mechanisms to have.
characteristics of human ToM are not much different from a chimp'swe simply obtain more stimulus, both quantitative and qualitative,
which would expand our understandings of others' mental states. In
sum, then, a ToM spectrum should stimulate the question that there
may be some variability in the information encapsulated within our
modules. In addition, it opens yet another question: is there variability
in translation from essential information to behavior? Put differently, if
our ToMM contains the same essential elements that a chimp's does,
why is there a cognitive limitation on how it is used? Is it simply a
matter of language?
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Conclusion
It seems that the debates need not be black or white in the case
of ToM. Specifically, why should we confine ToM as an "Either/Or"
debate rather than a matter of "degree"? From an evolutionary
standpoint, it is possible that at the level of mental abstractions,
chimpanzees simply did not require an elaboration of the basic aspects
of ToM found in 2-year-old (desires and perceptions) and 3-year-old
(remember) humans.
Along the same lines, the chimpanzees'
understanding of others' mental states may simply be regarded as less
developed or more restricted than humans'. However, until we have a
better understanding of how our own minds work, the debate will likely
not see a conclusion any time soon, and nor should it. Bridging the
chasm between our distant cousins and ourselves will be no simple
task, but nevertheless a worthy one.

Footnotes
1 While the term "module" and its applicability continues to rouse
much debate (one such example is found in Fodor 2000; Pinker
Forthcoming; Sperber 2002), it should be clear that employing this
terminology is unavoidable given the nature of the debate discussed
below. In addition, see the difference between "diachronic" and
"synchronic" modularity as discussed in Scholl and Leslie (1999).

2 Here, Scholl and Leslie are suggesting longitudinal variability.
Below, I question cross-species variability of the same or similar
mechanism(s) at a fully-functional degree.

3 In an engaging article, Kristin Andrews (2005) argues that the
experiments that researchers employ--particularly Povinelli and
Vonk-actually operate with the tacit assumption that a human child's
mind is not equipped with a ToM. Povinelli and Vonk operate
similarly to the above-mentioned logic.
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